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Abstract: In this paper, we argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting 
the phenomenology of emotional experiences, and that introspection of emotional experiences is 
a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state, 
i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected emotion as an instance 
of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. 
Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection is a necessary 
ground to acquire knowledge of emotions. Our main argument is phenomenological: by examining 
a variety of examples, we suggest that an accurate analysis of the introspective process through 
which one comes to know, or refines one’s knowledge of, one’s current emotion requires that one 




For centuries, at least since Descartes, introspection was considered as the central and fundamental 
method for the investigation of human mind. According to the Cartesian tradition, the results of 
introspection are even infallible and indubitable. Though some philosophers and psychologists 
were more cautious than Descartes about the epistemic power of introspection (see, e.g., Kant 
(1786/1883, ‘Preface’: 141-142), Brentano (1874: 30), Wundt (1897: 21)), almost none of them 
questioned its fundamentality for the study of mind until the 20th century. Since the downfall of 
introspectionism and the advent of behaviorism and then of functionalism, introspection has been 
progressively marginalized. Both philosophers (see, e.g., Dennett 1991, Blackmore 2002, and 
Schwitzgebel 2011) and psychologists (see, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977, Gazzaniga 1995, Wilson 
2002, and Johansson et al. 2005) have discredited introspection, which is now widely considered 
as an unreliable and untrustworthy method for both psychological studies and self-knowledge 
acquisition. 
Although we agree that the Cartesian claims about the epistemic power of introspection are 
overblown and should be downscaled, we believe that the pessimistic trend in philosophy of mind 
and cognitive psychology has excessively deflated the role of introspection. Though not necessarily 
infallible, introspection plays a crucial and fundamental role in the acquisition of self-knowledge 
(or, at least, of some self-knowledge). In this paper, we focus on self-knowledge of emotions and 
we argue that introspection is necessary for its acquisition. 
In particular, we argue that knowledge of conscious emotions essentially depends on 
introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences. By “conscious emotions” we mean 
“phenomenally conscious emotions.” Some emotions may occur unconsciously and thereby unfelt 
by their subject. Conscious emotions, however, are emotions that occur consciously and have 
phenomenology: there is “something it is like” for their subject to undergo them (Nagel 1974)—they 
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have a subjective and qualitative feel. Knowledge of conscious emotions typically implies identifying the 
type of emotion one is undergoing (e.g., anger, regret); at the very least, it involves an apprehension 
or acquisition of information about the relevant emotion and its properties. Introspection is the 
distinctively first-personal process through which we can get knowledge of, or at least acquire 
information about, our conscious experiences. We argue that introspection of emotional 
experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory 
introspective state, i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected 
emotion as an instance of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of 
introspection primitive introspection. Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive 
introspection is a necessary ground to acquire knowledge of emotions. Our main argument is 
phenomenological: by examining a variety of examples, we suggest that an accurate analysis of the 
introspective process through which one comes to know, or refines one’s knowledge of, one’s 
current emotion requires that one primitively introspects it. 
The paper is organized as follows. In §1, we argue that self-knowledge of an emotion requires 
knowledge of the phenomenology of an emotional experience. In §2, we introduce the 
phenomenon of primitive introspection and suggest that there are independent reasons for 
thinking that it is a psychologically real phenomenon (independently of its application to the 
specific case of knowledge of emotions). In §3, we draw a sketch of the introspective process by 
stages which, we argue, is involved in the acquisition of knowledge of emotions. In §4, we present 
some everyday-life examples in which one tries to get or improve knowledge of one’s own current 
emotion. By providing an analysis of these examples, we argue that primitive introspection is a 
necessary (albeit not sufficient) ground for knowledge of our emotions. 
 
1. Knowing emotions 
Emotions constitute a very significant aspect of our life. They often play a crucial role in motivating 
our actions and they affect our interaction with our environment and with other people. They may 
reveal to us what we care about and what we do not—our values (Deonna and Teroni 2012)—
and are therefore sometimes claimed to be part of what grounds our moral judgments (Döring 
2007). By knowing our emotions, we thus come to know one of the most important aspects of 
ourselves. Indeed, arguably, knowledge of our emotions constitutes an essential stage of the 
process through which we acquire or improve self-knowledge and self-understanding. 
There is no general agreement about the nature of emotions. So-called feeling theories (Prinz 
2004), inspired by the James-Lange theory (James 1884; Lange 1885), identify emotions with 
perceptions of bodily sensations. These theories sound particularly plausible when we think about 
emotions that clearly display a bodily component: fright, for instance, involves sudden increase in 
heartbeat—one feels as if, so to speak, one’s heart is about to leap out of one’s chest. Opponents 
of feeling theories object that, by focusing only on the “innerly directed” bodily-sensation aspect, 
they overlook the “outwardly directed” intentional and evaluative aspect of emotions—the fact 
that emotional experiences are intentionally directed toward a person, object, event, or situation and 
involve an evaluation of such person, object, event, or situation. Three main theories put 
intentionality and evaluation at the center of their account of emotions: cognitivist theories, perceptual 
theories, and attitudinal theories. 
Cognitivist theories reduce emotions to cognitive states such as judgments or thoughts (Solomon 
1976; Nussbaum 2001). The idea is that emotions are constituted by an evaluative judgment about 
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a person, object, event, or situation.1 On this view, being frightened by a snake consists in judging 
that the snake is dangerous or threatening. Cognitivist theories seem to be particularly fit for 
emotions which manifestly involve an intellectual component; disappointment, for instance, 
involves a judgment to the effect that one’s expectations have been disregarded or frustrated.2 
Perceptual theories construe emotional experiences as perceptual representations (as) of evaluative 
properties (Tye 2008; Mendelovici 2014; Tappolet 2016; Mitchell 2020). On this view, being 
frightened by a snake consists in perceiving the snake and its dangerousness (or perceiving the snake 
as having the property of being dangerous). Those theories are partly motivated by the thought 
that, although intentionality and evaluation are a central and essential aspect of emotion, they do 
not (or not always) take the form of a judgment: judgment, it is argued, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to have an emotion. On the one hand, an infant, who does not yet possess the concepts 
“snake” or “dangerous” and thereby cannot form the judgment that the snake is dangerous, may 
still feel frightened by a snake. On the other hand, one may judge that the snake is dangerous 
without experiencing fear of the snake. 
On attitudinal theories, the evaluative aspect of emotions is not part of the content of the 
emotion, but it is rather what constitutes the subject’s attitude toward what the emotion is about 
(Deonna and Teroni 2012, 2015, 2020; Scarantino 2014). On this view, being frightened by a snake 
consists in taking an evaluative, danger-related attitude toward the snake. 
Opting for a particular theory of emotions is not our present concern and we aim to remain 
neutral about what the fundamental nature of emotions is. We just assume that, regardless of 
whether what most fundamentally characterizes the nature of emotions is their sensory, cognitive 
or evaluative dimension, we should acknowledge that all those dimensions are relevant when it 
comes to knowledge of our own emotions. 
What most interests us here is the relationship between emotions and phenomenology. To be sure, 
some emotions may be unconscious and lack phenomenology. Conscious emotions, however, 
always involve emotional experiences and emotional experiences have phenomenology.3 Arguably, 
each emotional experience type has a specific phenomenological profile. If so, then the 
phenomenal character of an emotional experience is at least part of what individuates a certain 
conscious emotion—what makes it the emotion it is. As before, philosophers disagree as to how 
to analyze emotional phenomenology. Feeling theorists—unsurprisingly—aim to reduce 
emotional phenomenology to sensory bodily (proprioceptive and interoceptive) phenomenology. 
Cognitivists, arguably, may want to reduce it to cognitive phenomenology, while perceptualists and 
attitudinalists tend to reduce it to sensory perceptual (exteroceptive or world-directed) 
phenomenology, where part of what appears to be perceived are evaluative properties of the 
intentional object of the emotion. A more sophisticated reductive analysis of emotional 
phenomenology has been proposed by Uriah Kriegel (2015, Ch. 4), who argues for a ‘conjunctive’ 
account on which emotional phenomenology is a combination of proprioceptive, cognitive, 
conative, and algedonic phenomenology. All these are reductive accounts of emotional 
 
1 Some cognitivist theories reduce emotion to belief-desire compounds (Gordon 1987). 
2 There are also theories that combine the perceptual and the cognitive dimension. On Schachter and Singer’s (1962) 
theory, for example, emotions are a combination of (i) physiological arousal (e.g. increase in heartbeat) and (ii) a 
cognitive interpretation of it (e.g. “I feel that I am facing something dangerous”). 
3 It is plausible to think that conscious emotions do not merely involve emotional experiences, but just are emotional 
experiences. Indeed, we tend to think so. However, some theorists argue that emotional experience is just one component 
of conscious emotion (see e.g. Goldie 2000). The weaker claim that conscious emotions constitutively involve 
emotional experience is both neutral on this issue and sufficient for our purposes. 
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phenomenology—they aim to reduce the phenomenology of emotions to other kinds of 
phenomenology. Non-reductive theorists (Montague 2009; Dewalque 2017; Mitchell 2020b), by 
contrast, maintain that, although emotional experiences may and sometimes do display 
phenomenological features that are characteristic of other kinds of experiences, they also have a 
sui generis phenomenology, i.e. a kind of phenomenology that is not reducible to that of any other 
kind of experience. 
We do not intend to adjudicate the reductivist/non-reductivist debate here. What matters to 
us is that, although they disagree about what emotional phenomenology most fundamentally 
consists in, most theorists involved in that debate agree on the following: (i) conscious emotions 
have phenomenology and (ii) such phenomenology may be, at least, sensory-bodily, sensory-
perceptual, evaluative, cognitive, conative, or algedonic. These two points we are going to take for 
granted.4 
Arguably, the phenomenal character of each conscious emotion contributes to making it the 
emotion it is.5 This is not to say that the phenomenal character of an emotion exhausts what that 
emotion is.6 Some features of emotions, such as their intentionality, their valence, their tendency 
to motivate our action, or their individuation as instances of a recognizable emotional type may be 
(partly) grounded in something other than the phenomenology. For instance, they may depend on 
contextual factors such as the cause of the emotion, or on social factors, such as the social 
conventions or norms influencing the construing of our emotional-concept repertoire. Still, the 
role played by phenomenology in the individuation of an emotion is crucial. Arguably, one could 
not be in a state of sorrow without some particular event or situation appearing sorrowful to one, 
or without having that sensation as of a lump in one’s throat, or without feeling such a deep inner 
negative oppression, which are typical of sorrow experiences. One could not be in a state of joy 
and at the same time perceive the object of one’s current emotion as threatening, or feel 
contortions in one’s viscera as when one is in a state of anxiety; or be disappointed while 
experiencing felt approval with respect to what one is disappointed about; or be disgusted by 
something while feeling attracted, instead of repelled, by it.7;8 
To see the same point from a slightly different angle, consider the following case. Imagine you 
are in a state of intense anger. Your emotional experience may display some of the following 
phenomenal features: feeling your heart beating hard, your chest as if blood were boiling inside it, 
your face as if it were on fire, and your head as if it were about to explode (sensory-bodily 
phenomenology); experiencing a particular person as disrespectful (sensory-perceptual and 
 
4 Nota bene: we do not, by this, mean to assume that sensory-bodily, sensory-perceptual, evaluative, cognitive, conative, 
and algedonic phenomenology are all sui generis (i.e., irreducible to each other). Cognitive phenomenology, for instance, 
is object of lively debate, the question being whether it is sui generis or it reduces to sensory phenomenology, if it exists 
at all. Although we do assume that there is cognitive phenomenology (there is something it is like to judge that 
genocide is wrong, or to suspect that somebody left the door open), we remain neutral as to whether it is sui generis. 
Ditto as to conative phenomenology. 
5 For ease of exposition, from now on, unless explicitly specified, by “emotion” we will refer to conscious emotion. 
6 There are philosophers who argue for a thesis along these lines, though. Uriah Kriegel (2015, Ch. 4), for instance, 
argues that the existence and identity conditions of an emotion consist in bearing the right relation to a combination 
of sensory, cognitive, conative, and algedonic phenomenology. 
7 One may, perhaps, be disgusted by something and nonetheless desire it. In this case, though, the feeling of attraction 
would be associated with one’s concomitant desire, rather than with one’s state of disgust. The state of disgust itself 
must still display the typical feeling of repulsion if it is to be present at all. One would then be both attracted (in virtue 
of one’s desire) and repelled (in virtue of one’s disgust) by the object of one’s experience. 
8 For an argument to the effect that evaluative phenomenology (involving the object of the emotion appearing to the 




evaluative phenomenology); feeling the urge to scream, to hurl something on the floor, or hit the 
person who disrespected you (conative phenomenology); feeling bad, or feeling the unpleasantness 
of your current state of mind (algedonic phenomenology); having the thought that what that 
person did was deeply disrespectful vividly present before your mind (cognitive phenomenology). 
If these phenomenal features were stripped away from your current experience, what would be 
left? Would your anger be still present? Arguably not.9 It thus seems that the phenomenal character 
of an emotion is an essential part of what makes a certain emotion the emotion it is.10 
Accordingly, when it comes to the task of knowing one’s conscious emotions, getting a grasp 
of the phenomenology of the relevant emotion is a fundamental stage of the inquiry. Arguably, 
knowing one’s emotion partly consists in identifying such an emotion—telling which emotion it is 
that one is having. If, as we have tried to show, phenomenology is an essential aspect of what 
makes a certain emotion the emotion it is, then knowing an emotion’s phenomenology is a 
necessary element in one’s knowledge of one’s emotions.11 
The following objection may be raised against our claim that knowing an emotion requires 
knowing its phenomenology.12 Suppose that someone (that you consider as a reliable emotion 
detector—say, a trained emotion psychologist) tells you that you are angry. While before you did 
not have any knowledge of what emotion you were undergoing, now, on the basis of third-person 
testimony, you come to realize that you are in fact angry. In this case, the objection goes, 
testimonial evidence is sufficient for you to get knowledge of your emotion—knowledge of the 
phenomenology is not required. A more fine-grained analysis of the example, however, shows that 
if your anger is conscious, then testimonial evidence is not sufficient for you to come to know it. For 
either your anger is conscious, or it is unconscious. If it is unconscious, then it does not have 
phenomenology; so, obviously, knowledge of phenomenology cannot be a requirement on 
knowledge of it. In this case, testimonial knowledge may be sufficient—it may be reasonable to 
defer knowledge of one’s unconscious emotions to a reliable third person. It is partly for this 
reason that our claim only concerns conscious emotions. If, on the other hand, your anger is 
conscious, then testimonial evidence is not sufficient for you to come to know it. It may be that 
before the psychologist tells you that you are angry you did not notice any anger phenomenology. 
Once s/he points out to you that you are angry, you realize that there is indeed quite a lot of anger 
phenomenology to be found in yourself. By noticing such phenomenology, you come to know 
that you are indeed angry—the psychologist is right. Although it triggers your introspective 
attention and directs it toward the anger phenomenology, the testimonial evidence you get from 
the psychologist is not yet sufficient for you to get knowledge of your conscious anger: you also 
need to attend to the phenomenology of your experience and check whether it is consistent with 
the psychologist’s claim. More generally, when it comes to conscious emotions, fully deferring 
knowledge of them to a third person does not seem to be reasonable. Given that the emotion is 
conscious, the subject is in a position to check whether third-person testimonial evidence matches 
first-person introspective evidence; indeed, the subject ought to undergo such a checking process, 
 
9 A similar argument can be designed even for those who believe that there is no cognitive phenomenology at all. For, 
arguably, even if stripping away all the phenomenal features of anger experience leaves you with some thoughts or 
judgments to the effect that an injustice or disrespect has occurred, these are not sufficient for you to be in a state of 
anger—you may entertain the same thoughts while not being angry. 
10 Our argument is partly similar to William James’ (1884) “subtraction argument.” 
11 On the essential role of phenomenology in knowledge of conscious emotions see also Whiting (2018, 2020). 
12 This objection was raised, in slightly different guises, by two referees for PPQ. 
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via knowledge of the phenomenology, if s/he is to be genuinely said to know their conscious 
emotion. 
So, knowing an emotion’s phenomenology is a necessary element in one’s knowledge of one’s 
emotions. To be sure, we do not claim that knowledge of emotional phenomenology exhausts 
knowledge of emotions. As noted, what makes a certain emotion the emotion it is may outstrip its 
phenomenology, and there is more to knowing our emotions than knowing what emotions they 
are. Nevertheless, knowledge of an emotion’s phenomenology is a necessary condition for having a 
certain kind of individuative knowledge of it. 
Moreover, it seems that knowing the phenomenology of emotions is an important aspect of 
what one aims at when one seeks to know one’s own emotions. When one wants to know a current 
emotion of one’s, arguably, one wants to know not only what emotion one feels (i.e., how the 
emotion should be categorized), but also how the emotion feels (i.e., what its peculiar phenomenal 
features are). 
One cannot get complete knowledge of the phenomenology of one’s emotional experience 
simply by observing one’s own behavior or by looking at a scan of one’s brain.13 Knowing the 
phenomenology of a certain emotional experience requires a first-personal method: it fundamentally 
depends on introspection. Introspection, as we understand it, is the distinctively first-personal 
method through which one can get knowledge of or acquire information about one’s current 
conscious state. It is distinctively first-personal in that only the subject of a given experience can 
introspect it—one cannot introspect others’ experiences. It is directed toward experiences that are 
conscious—one cannot introspect unconscious states—and present—one cannot introspect past 
experiences (even if one can introspect present recollections of past experiences). 
On our view, merely having a conscious mental state is not yet sufficient for introspection. To 
introspect a conscious state of one’s, one needs also, at the very least, to attend to it. Imagine you 
are drinking some flavory herbal tea while reading this. If you are to describe your taste experience 
based on introspection, you need, first, to switch your attention from the reading to the 
experience—arguably, you cannot accomplish the task if all or most of your attentional resources 
are directed toward the text.14 Although, arguably, your taste experience is conscious even while 
your attention is absorbed by the reading, it is not yet introspected until you attend to it. Moreover, 
for you to get the information that is relevant to your introspective description of the taste 
experience, your attention toward it needs be sustained. Both drawing and sustaining attention 
toward a conscious state involve an activity on the part of the subject that is both effortful and 
voluntary (cf. Watzl 2011; Wu 2011). Accordingly, introspection does not occur automatically or 
passively: it requires an effortful and voluntary activity.15 
 
13 This is consistent with a physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. For even physicalist theories often 
recognize that although phenomenal properties reduce to neural properties, phenomenal concepts are not analyzable in 
terms of neural concepts and require first-personal familiarity for their acquisition. 
14 Must all your attentional resources be devoted to the taste experience for you to introspect it? Probably not: 
something less than the totality of attention could be sufficient for introspection (on the plausible assumption that 
attention is a gradable phenomenon). Exactly how much of the attentional resources is required for introspection is 
an empirical question we do not intend to address here. For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out that, for there 
to be introspection, a considerable amount of one’s attentional resources must be devoted to the target conscious 
state (say, at least 50%). 
15 It may occur that attention is grabbed by a certain conscious state (say, because of its suddenness or intensity). In this 
kind of cases, the drawing of attention is not effortful or voluntary. Still, if one is to introspect the state that grabbed one’s 
attention, one also has to sustain attention toward it, which does involve an effortful and voluntary activity. 
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Introspection may, for all we argue here, be directed at aspects of one’s current conscious state 
that are distinct from the phenomenology. If, for instance, the propositional content of one’s 
current thought or occurrent belief is not exhausted by its phenomenology, such content can 
nonetheless be a target of introspection—for all we will be arguing here, at least. Regardless of 
what the different introspectible aspects of conscious life are, what we are concerned with here is 
introspection of the phenomenology of our current conscious experiences, i.e., the distinctively first-
personal method through which we can get knowledge of, or acquire information about, the 
phenomenology of our current conscious experiences. This is what we will refer to by 
“introspection” throughout the rest of the paper. Introspection of the phenomenology of 
emotional experiences, we argue, is a fundamental step in the acquisition of knowledge of our own 
emotions. 
 
2. Primitive introspection 
Introspection is often taken to be judgment-like:16 by introspecting an experience of one’s, one 
forms an introspective thought, or judgment, about it, which typically involves classifying it as an 
instance of a certain experience type. For instance, by drawing your attention to what you feel in 
your stomach, you may form the judgment that you feel an unpleasant burning sensation there; in 
this case, you classify the sensation as “unpleasant’ and “burning”. 
Here, however, we argue that introspection is not always judgment-like. Some introspective 
states do not involve classifying what is introspected as an instance of any experience type. We call 
such non-judgmental and non-classificatory introspection primitive introspection. In this section we 
provide some support to the idea that primitive introspection is a psychologically real 
phenomenon. We also point at some of the features of such introspection. Although the bulk of 
the paper focuses on the role of primitive introspection in knowledge of emotions, we argue that 
primitive introspection is a broader phenomenon: not only emotions but all phenomenally 
conscious states can be the target of primitive introspection. Accordingly, this section’s arguments 
hinge on a broader sample of experiences (not merely emotional ones). The idea is that, quite 
independently of its role in knowledge of emotions, there are reasons for thinking that primitive 
introspection is real. 
 
2.1. The psychological reality of primitive introspection 
Consider the following example. Imagine caressing a chenille pullover with your right hand and 
considering the tactile experience you are having. To apprehend your current tactile sensation—
to acquire information about its phenomenology—you will probably need to draw your attention 
to it: you need to attend to the sensation you feel on the palm of your right hand. You can thereby 
form a number of introspective judgments about your sensation. You may introspectively judge, 
for example, that the tactile sensation you are having is a sensation of softness. Since you have 
already undergone softness tactile sensations before, you immediately recognize this one as a 
softness sensation; you immediately classify it as an instance of an experience type you have already 
encountered—a tactile experience of softness. Perhaps you may have been acquainted enough 
with chenille pullovers that, when you introspect your tactile sensation, you also immediately 
 
16 See e.g. Armstrong 1968; Dretske 1994; Shoemaker 1996; Byrne 2005; Gertler 2011. 
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recognize it as a chenille-touching sensation. Let us call the introspective process we have in this 
case “reflective introspection”. 
Although in the previous case you immediately recognize your experience as an instance of a 
certain experience type upon introspecting it, it need not be so. If, for instance, you had never 
touched chenille before, you would not be able to classify your sensation as a chenille-touching 
sensation. And if you had never had any softness tactile sensation before, you would not be able 
to classify your sensation as a softness tactile sensation either. Still, you would be able to introspect 
your sensation: you would surely be able to attend to the sensation you feel on the palm of your 
right hand and acquire information about its phenomenology, although you would not be able to 
recognize that phenomenology as an instance of any specific previously encountered 
phenomenology type. 
It may be objected that, in the latter case, there is still at least one experience type such that 
you would be able to introspect your sensation as an instance of it, namely tactile experience: at the 
very least, you can introspectively judge that this experience you are having is an experience of 
touch. True, but consider someone who has never had any tactile experience—say, because of a 
condition affecting their sense of touch—who finally has one for the first time while caressing a 
chenille pullover, right after the condition has been cured. Here there is no experience type such 
that this person could classify their experience as an instance of it. Nevertheless, they can 
introspect it—they can introspect it, as we will put it, primitively. 
An objector may argue that, although the touch-deprived person cannot classify their 
experience as a touch experience, they can still classify it by appeal to a demonstrative concept: by 
attending to the experience, they may “mentally point to” it and thereby refer to it via the 
demonstrative THIS.17 Now, we can distinguish two kinds of demonstrative concepts (Gertler 
2001). Descriptive demonstratives have a descriptive component, that contributes to determining 
the referent by classifying what is referred to as a token of a certain type (e.g., THAT DOG, THIS 
PERSON, THAT OBJECT, THIS EXPERIENCE). Pure demonstratives, on the other hand, have no 
descriptive component: they only involve the subject’s attending to what s/he intends to refer to and, 
on that basis, form the concept THIS (or THAT). Although the touch-deprived person cannot refer 
to their new experience via the descriptive demonstrative THIS TOUCH EXPERIENCE, they may still 
refer to it via either (a) the descriptive demonstrative THIS EXPERIENCE or (b) the pure 
demonstrative THIS. However, via neither (a) nor (b) can the touch-deprived person classify their 
experience as an instance of a previously encountered experience type. Via (a), they merely classify it as an 
experience (not as belonging to a more specific experience type). Via (b), they do not classify it at all 
(since, by its nature, the pure demonstrative lacks any descriptive component). Although we think 
that primitive introspection does not require the use of any demonstrative concept, all we say in 
what follows is compatible with a view such that primitive introspection may involve the use of 
either (a) or (b). What is crucial for our purpose is that being in a state of primitive introspection 
does not involve classifying the introspected experience as an instance of any previously encountered 
experience type. 
A further objection that may be raised is that the touch-deprived person can still classify their 
experience as new (i.e., as an instance of a kind of experience they have never had before). This 
may well be true—though, arguably, such a classification is not required for them to introspect the 
experience. However, classifying an experience as new does not imply classifying it as an instance of 
any previously encountered experience type—indeed, classifying it as new implies classifying it as an 
 
17 This objection was raised to us by an anonymous referee for PPQ. 
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instance of no previously encountered experience type. Therefore, ability to such a classification is 
still compatible with primitive introspection (though it is not required for primitive introspection).18 
The touch-deprived person scenario may strike the reader as too far-fetched. There are, 
however, everyday-life cases featuring what we call “primitive introspection.” First, cases in which 
one has a kind of experience (e.g., an orgasm) for the first time. In these cases, one simply cannot 
form an introspective judgment about the relevant experience because one does not know how to 
classify the relevant experience. Second, cases in which, even if one could form an introspective 
judgment, one chooses not to. Some meditation practitioners, for instance, claim to seek to 
introspectively attend to their current experiences while abstaining from forming any judgment 
about them. If they actually succeed in doing what they claim they are doing, their practice involves 
primitive introspection. Third, even when one does form an introspective judgment about one’s 
current experience, there are innumerable aspects of its phenomenology that elude classification 
and thereby fail to be captured by the judgment. Nonetheless, those subtle phenomenological 
aspects can be introspected.19 Therefore, even when one reflectively introspects one’s current 
experience, one may, at the same time, introspect it primitively and thereby grasp the details of the 
phenomenology that elude classification—where by “grasping” we mean a kind of apprehension 
that implies acquisition of information (more on this in §2.2).20 
We take these considerations to provide prima facie evidence that primitive introspection is 
psychologically real. For a more complete defense of the psychological reality of primitive 
introspection, see Giustina (2019a). 
 
2.2. Features of primitive introspection 
Like all introspective states, primitive introspection involves an effortful and voluntary activity that 
requires drawing and sustaining attention toward the target experience. More specifically, to 
primitively introspect an experience, one must draw and sustain one’s attention toward its 
phenomenology. For you to primitively introspect your chenille touch experience, you need to focus 
your attention on the way the touch sensation feels to you—to “what it is like” for you to have 
that sensation. 
As noted, primitive introspection is non-classificatory: to be in a state of primitive 
introspection, not only one needs not classify the introspected experience as an instance of any 
 
18 For a discussion that relates first-exposure experiences and non-conceptuality regarding the specific case of 
emotional experiences see Mitchell (2020a). 
19 It may be objected that if those subtle aspects of the phenomenology are unclassifiable, then they are just non-
introspectable (this objection was raised by an anonymous referee for PPQ). Now, if introspection is defined as a process 
that requires classification (because, say, a process is introspective only if it outputs classificatory judgments), then such 
phenomenal aspects are obviously not introspectable. If, instead, classification is not built into the definition of 
introspection (if, for example, introspection is characterized as a distinctively first-personal process through which the 
subject acquires information about their current experience, where information acquisition does not necessarily 
involve classification), then the claim that subtle unclassifiable phenomenological aspects are introspectable is not 
obviously false. Regardless of the terminological issue concerning the definition of “introspection,” our substantial 
claim is that there is a mental process, that we call “primitive introspection,” that involves the subject’s attending to 
their current experience, and through which they can non-classificatorily acquire information about its 
phenomenology. 
20 Our argument here is somewhat analogous to the fineness of grain argument for non-conceptual perceptual content 
(Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992; Tye 1995; Heck 2000). 
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experience type—one must not do so. Although it can co-occur with reflective (classificatory) 
introspection, mere primitive introspection is inherently free of classification. 
Through primitive introspection one apprehends the phenomenology of the target 
experience—one acquires information about it. When you draw your introspective attention 
toward your chenille touch experience, you get information about what it is like for you to have 
that experience—about its ‘qualitative appearance’, so to speak. In primitive introspection, the 
acquisition of information occurs independently of any classification. When you reflectively 
introspect that your touch experience is a feeling of softness, the information you acquire is 
classificatory and coarse-grained: you acquire the information that your experience is a softness 
experience. When, instead, you primitively introspect your touch experience, the information you 
acquire is non-classificatory and thereby maximally fine-grained: you get information about how 
this experience feels to you, information that is more fine-grained and detailed than the information 
that this experience feels like an experience of softness, or like an experience of touching chenille. 
To get a better grasp of the kind of information acquired through primitive introspection, 
consider Fred Dretske’s (1981) distinction between digital and analog information: 
[A] signal […] carries the information that s is F in digital form if and only if the signal carries no 
additional information about s, no information that is not already nested in s’s being F. If the signal does 
carry additional information about s, no information that is not nested in s’s being F, then I shall say 
that the signal carries this information in analog form. When a signal carries the information that s is F 
in analog form, the signal always carries more specific, more determinate information about s than it is 
F. (Dretske 1981: 137)21 
If you receive the information that your car was crushed by a tree via a text message reading “Your 
car was crushed by a tree,” the information you receive is in digital format (the signal carries no 
additional information on top of the information that your car was crushed by a tree). If, instead, 
you receive the same piece of information via a picture of your crushed car, the information you 
receive is in analog format (the signal carries additional information about the magnitude of the 
tree, the part of the car that was crushed, etc.). 
The idea, then, is that while by reflective introspection the subject can acquire information about 
the phenomenology of their experience in digital format, by primitive introspection the subject 
acquires, at least, information in analog format. Through primitive introspection, the subject 
acquires additional information with respect to what they acquire via reflective introspection. The 
information acquired via primitive introspection is more specific, more determinate, more fine-
grained with respect to the information acquired via reflective introspection.22 
It may be objected that, while the function of reflective introspection is quite 
straightforward—at the very least, providing the subject with knowledge of the type of experience 
s/he is undergoing—it is unclear what the function of primitive introspection is.23 As we will argue 
in §3 and §4, the primary role of primitive introspection is to ground reflective introspection—it 
has an instrumental function. The information acquired via primitive introspection constitutes the 
basis for the classification process whose upshot is reflective introspection (more on this in §3). 
We also believe that, in virtue of providing the subject with analog information about the 
 
21 The information that s is G is nested in s’s being F iff s’s being F carries the information that s is G (Dretske 1981: 
71). 
22 See Giustina (2019b) for a more thorough discussion of information acquisition in primitive and reflective 
introspection. 
23 We owe this objection to an anonymous referee for PPQ. 
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phenomenology of their experience, primitive introspection constitutes a cognitive achievement 
in and of itself. This is admittedly more controversial and indeed it is not the main claim we are 
going to defend in what follows.24 Our main claim is that primitive introspection plays a crucial 
role in the introspective process that leads to the formation of an introspective judgment; as we 
will argue in §4, it is a necessary ground to acquire knowledge of conscious emotions. 
In sum, primitive introspection is an effortful and voluntary activity that consists in attending 
to and non-classificatorily acquiring information about the phenomenology of one’s current 
conscious experience. 
 
3. A process by stages  
The objects of self-knowledge are quite diverse. Beside knowledge of one’s own emotions, self-
knowledge includes knowledge of one’s propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, intentions 
and hopes (which may be conscious—occurrent—or unconscious—standing), knowledge of one’s 
current thoughts, and knowledge of one’s perceptual, proprioceptive, algedonic, bodily, and 
imaginative experiences. It also includes knowledge of some aspects of oneself that are not 
conscious but typically emerge in our behavior, such as one’s personal preferences, aptitudes, and 
character traits.25 It is very unlikely that there is one single process through which all self-knowledge 
is acquired. More probably, a variety of processes contribute to the acquisition of self-knowledge. 
Introspection, on our view, is one of them. Introspection may be supplemented by several 
different processes, among which behavior observation, inference, testimony, outward perception, 
rationality considerations, memory, etc. As colorfully pointed out by Eric Schwitzgebel, the 
formation of introspective judgments seems to involve 
a cognitive confluence of crazy spaghetti, with aspects of self-detection, self-shaping, self-
fulfillment, spontaneous expression, priming and association, categorical assumptions, outward 
perception, memory, inference, hypothesis testing, bodily activity, and who only knows what else, 
all feeding into our judgments about current states of mind. (Schwitzgebel 2012: 41) 
However, though introspective judgments may arise from a confluence of different cognitive 
processes—differently from Schwitzgebel (2012: 29)—we do not take this to imply that a unified 
introspective process cannot be isolated and described. In this section, we provide a sketchy outline 
of what, on our view, such a process involves. 
 
3.1. The stages of the introspective process 
The introspective process can be analyzed into three main stages: (i) primitive introspection, (ii) reflective 
introspection, (iii) descriptive introspective judgment. We will preliminarily illustrate the process as though 
it is linear, for clarity of exposition. In §3.4 we will revisit it in light of the complexities of concrete 
mental life. 
 
24 For a defense of the intrinsic epistemic significance of primitive introspection see Giustina (2018, Ch. 6) and De 
Vlieger (2018, Ch. 4). 




The first stage is primitive introspection. As noted, it involves a state of attentive apprehension, in 
virtue of which the subject non-classificatorily acquires information about the phenomenology of the 
introspected experience. 
The second stage is what we called reflective introspection. It consists in classifying the introspected 
experience as an instance of a known experience type. At this stage, the subject gives or attempts 
an interpretation of the introspected experience: they try to figure out what kind of experience it is. 
Classifying an experience involves at least (i) distinguishing it from other experiences on the basis of 
its phenomenology and (ii) recognizing it as an instance of a previously encountered experience type. 
Plausibly, this implies applying some concepts.26 In particular, it implies the deployment of phenomenal 
concepts, i.e., concepts associated with the phenomenology of experience. Different kinds of 
experience are associated with different phenomenal concepts: pain experiences are associated 
with the phenomenal concept PAIN, bluish experiences are associated with the phenomenal 
concept PHENOMENAL BLUE, and so on. Interpretation therefore consists in mobilizing some 
phenomenal concepts and applying them to the experience. Phenomenal concepts may be more 
or less determinate, and any experience may be associated with many phenomenal concepts at 
different levels of determinacy. For example, a bluish experience may be associated with 
PHENOMENAL BLUE, but also with its determinate PHENOMENAL COBALT and its determinable 
PHENOMENAL COLOR. Accordingly, the classification involved in reflective introspection may vary 
in degree of determinacy. Deploying a phenomenal concept in reflective introspection does not 
yet require the subject to master the linguistic expression through which such a concept could be 
expressed in public terms: to have and deploy the concept PHENOMENAL COBALT one does not 
need to master the word “cobalt”.  
The third stage is what we may call descriptive introspective judgment. It consists in describing the 
introspective experience in publicly accessible terms, i.e., forming a linguistically expressible 
judgment through which the experience and its phenomenology can be communicated. At this 
stage, the subject looks for the right words (linguistic expressions) they could use to report their 
experience and thereby communicate information about it to others. Here, the subject does need 
to master the linguistic expression(s) through which phenomenal concepts are expressed: to form 
the descriptive introspective judgment “this (visual experience) is phenomenal cobalt”, besides 
possessing the concept PHENOMENAL COBALT, one also needs to master the term “cobalt” (and, 
arguably, the word “phenomenal”).27 
 
3.2. From primitive introspection to reflective introspection 
Through primitive introspection the subject attends to the phenomenology of an experience and 
non-classificatorily acquires information about it. Reflective introspection is based on primitive 
introspection: the information that is acquired through primitive introspection constitutes the basis 
for classification. 
As noted, the classification process consists in recognizing the introspected experience as 
an instance of a previously encountered experience type. Part of the job consists in looking for the 
right concept that applies to the introspected experience (e.g., “is this pain or just itch?”). Another 
part of the job consists in refining one’s classification, i.e., trying to correctly apply a more 
 
26 By “concept” we mean a mental representation F that enables its subject to (i) distinguish Fs from non-Fs and (ii) 
recognize an F as an F (i.e., as an instance of the type F). 
27 For a more detailed description of the second and third introspective stage, see De Vlieger (2018, Ch. 4). 
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determinate or fine-grained phenomenal concept (e.g., from “this is a phenomenal-blue 
experience” to “this is a phenomenal-cobalt experience”). In either case, the information provided 
by primitive introspection is essential to concept application. For, to mobilize the right 
phenomenal concept, the subject preliminarily needs to have information about the 
phenomenology to which the concept is to be applied. Quite obviously, for you to figure out 
whether the concept that applies to your current experience is PAIN or ITCH, you need, first, to 
acquire information about the experience you are trying to classify. 
While engaging in the classificatory process, the subject may also appeal to other cognitive 
resources, such as memory, inference, reasoning, behavior observation, imagination, and outward 
perception. For example, it is often through memory that, after collecting information about its 
phenomenology, one can recognize an experience (“I had the same feeling when I came back from 
New York…”) and thereby classify it (“…it must be nostalgia”). Or, to give another example: 
sometimes observing our own behavior may provide further evidence in favor of a certain 
classification (as when the wide smile you meet in the mirror confirms that yes, you are really happy 
today). 
In sum: the classificatory process involved in reflective introspection is based on primitive 
introspection and may also recruit various other cognitive resources. 
 
3.3. From reflective introspection to descriptive introspective judgment 
The classification outputted by reflective introspection constitutes the basis for the formation of 
a descriptive introspective judgment, i.e., a judgment that is expressible in publicly accessible terms 
and through which the experience can be communicated via a linguistic report. The transition 
from the second to the third stage of the introspective process is performed via what may be called 
linguistic mapping. Linguistic mapping consists in appealing to one’s lexical arsenal to match the 
phenomenal concepts figuring in reflective introspection with public linguistic expressions and 
thereby form an introspective report through which one can communicate one’s own experience 
to others. 
 
3.4. The introspective process 
We described the introspective process as if it were somehow linear: from primitive introspection 
to reflective introspection through classification and then from reflective introspection to 
descriptive introspective judgment through linguistic mapping. However, the process is more 
complex than that. Upon primitively introspecting, the subject may immediately apply some 
phenomenal concept. However, they may subsequently realize that the apprehension on which the 
application of that phenomenal concept was based was only partial, or incomplete, and thereby 
judge that that phenomenal concept is not adequate; or that it is too coarse-grained—they may 
want to seek for a more determinate phenomenal concept. Accordingly, they will introspectively 
attend to their experience more closely.28 Since they aim to find a more appropriate phenomenal 
concept, they will need to avoid deploying the previously applied concept in their introspecting. 
That is, they will need to return to a state of primitive introspection. 
 
28 When the introspected experience is not long enough for one to draw introspective attention back to it, the subject 
may introspectively attend to a recollection of the original experience. 
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Similar considerations apply to the third stage—the formation of a descriptive introspective 
judgment. The subject may associate a certain word with the experience they introspect but turn 
out unsatisfied with their linguistic choice. Accordingly, they may return either to the second stage, 
and look for a better linguistic expression to communicate the concept that figures in the content 
of their state of reflective introspection, or even to the first stage, if they consider that their 
unsatisfaction traces back to an inadequate conceptualization. 
It may also occur that a subject is just unable to get to the second or the third stage of the 
introspective process. On the one hand, if a subject lacks the phenomenal concept(s) that would 
apply to the experience they are introspecting, they cannot engage in the classification process. 
This will prevent them from moving from primitive introspection to reflective introspection. On 
the other hand, a subject may possess the right phenomenal concept but lack the linguistic 
expression to communicate it. Sometimes, the subject may try to overcome this problem by 
appealing to evoking paraphrases or metaphors. However, it may occur that the subject is simply 
unable to communicate their experiences. (Indeed, it is not so uncommon that people find 
themselves helpless when it comes to describing their feelings.) 
Finally, although primitive introspection typically plays the role of grounding reflective 
introspection in the way described above, it need not do so. One may well just stop at the first 
introspective stage (as, for example, in cases of first-time experiences or meditation mentioned in 
§2) and contemplate or apprehend the experience independently of any classification. Indeed, one 
way of interpreting one possible aim of meditators is to try and stop our automatic tendency to 
move away from primitive introspection. 
Figure 1 outlines the different stages of the introspective process, as sketched in this section. 
We now turn to the application of the model presented here to the case self-knowledge of emotion. 
Our primary aim will be to show that primitive introspection is an ineliminable and fundamental 
step in the acquisition of such knowledge. 
 
4. Some case studies 
In this section, we argue that primitive introspection, though not sufficient, is a necessary ground 
of knowledge of emotions. For a subject to form, revise, or refine their judgments about their own 
Figure 1: the process of phenomenal introspection, a first approximation 
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emotional experiences, they need to engage in primitive introspection. Primitive introspection is 
not sufficient for a subject to achieve knowledge of their emotions: other cognitive processes, such 
as behavior observation, inference, testimony of others, outward perception, rationality 
considerations, memory, etc. may be recruited. However, no combination of such processes is, by 
itself, sufficient: the judgment-formation process needs to be based on primitive introspection. 
Our argument proceeds by examples. We present five case studies, each featuring a subject 
undergoing an emotional experience and trying to get knowledge of it. The first two cases concern 
emotions the subject has already undergone and can therefore recognize almost immediately, at 
least in a coarse-grained way. What marks the difference between the two cases is that in the second 
the subject tries to refine their judgments about the phenomenology of their emotional experience, 
even though they are familiar with it. The third and fourth cases feature a subject who encounters 
a certain emotion for the first time. In the third case, almost every aspect of the phenomenology 
is new to the subject, and they can perform no classification at all. In the fourth case, although the 
emotional experience (with its complex and composite phenomenology) is new to the subject, they 
can recognize some of its phenomenal elements and thus perform a partial or tentative 
classification. The first four examples feature emotions where the bodily component of the 
phenomenology is quite prominent—though other kinds of phenomenology (sensory-perceptual, 
evaluative, cognitive, conative, or algedonic) are also present. This is because bodily 
phenomenology is particularly apt to illustrate our point, partly because its nuances are perhaps 
easier to describe than those of other kinds of phenomenology (especially cognitive 
phenomenology), partly because it is more often the target of primitive introspection (though the 
other kinds of phenomenology can be the target of such introspection as well). The fifth example 
features introspection of a “cold” emotion (i.e., an emotional experience where the bodily 
component of the phenomenology is minimal or absent), to show how our claim applies to this 
kind of emotional experiences as well. 
We will argue that, in each case, primitive introspection plays a fundamental role in the 
subject’s understanding of their current emotion and is therefore a necessary step in the 
knowledge-acquisition process. To be sure, this is a limited set of cases. However, we believe that 
our reasoning generalizes to any case where a subject tries to form an adequate judgment of their 
ongoing emotional experience, whether they have previously encountered it or not, and enjoin the 
reader to think up counterexamples. 
 
4.1. Immediate recognition of a previously encountered emotion 
CAROLINE 
She got the job. Caroline feels her heart leaping inside her chest, a smile stretching across her lips, 
the whole body quivering with impatience and excitement. She feels the urge to jump in the air, 
run without ever stopping. She cannot stop thinking about how gratifying and stimulating her new 
work environment will be. The new job feels so exciting to her and the whole world appears to her 
as an open, welcoming, and wonderful place. She knows that this is joy, that the euphoria is washing 
over her, like the time she learned that she was admitted to a PhD program. She felt the very same 
sensations, the same kind of thoughts were running through her mind, and the world appeared to 
her as it appears now. The same feeling of lightness, like she were floating in the air. The same 
propulsive sensation, expanding from her chest and making her hop around when she tries to walk. 
This twofold sensation of tensed excitement and complete relaxation. The feeling that every muscle 
of her body is ready to do whatever she wants, making her feel like she can face any challenge right 
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now. An all-encompassing optimism informs the way she perceives people and things around her. 
She feels complete, open to the world, and radiant. She is so happy! 
As soon as she gets the good news, a set of changes occur in Caroline’s overall experience, which 
she can almost immediately recognize as constituents of euphoric happiness. Perhaps, 
overwhelmed by the intensity of the current emotion, she does not yet form the judgment “This 
feeling I’m having is euphoric happiness.” However, that piece of information is easily accessible 
to her: if asked about the reason she is hopping around like a grasshopper, she would immediately 
and effortlessly reply that she is immensely happy. For this information to be available to her, 
though, she needs to notice the goings-on that suddenly feature in her field of consciousness. She 
needs to attend, at least to a certain extent, to the phenomenology of her current experience and 
thereby become more focally aware of it. Given the intensity of the experience, the attention shift 
will not require much effort. Still, in order for her to formulate the judgment, some form of 
preliminary detection of the phenomenology needs to take place. To be sure, she may use other 
cues to form her judgment. She may observe her own behavior—hopping around, smiling 
helplessly—or reason that that job will add much value to her life and will be very rewarding. She 
recruits her memory when she compares her present state to the intense joy she felt when she 
entered the PhD program. However, by themselves, these elements are not sufficient to reach a 
judgment about what she feels. She could not compare her current phenomenology to a past 
phenomenology if she did not apprehend the current phenomenology in the first place; reasoning 
about the value of her new job supports the judgment that joy is a fitting reaction to it, but is silent 
about whether joy is actually occurring; and observing her own behavior can only suggest to her that 
she might feel joy (just because she knows that such a behavior is typically associated with this 
emotion), or it could confirm the results of her introspective inquiry, but, alone, it is not sufficient 
for her to know that joy is occurring. Memory, inference, and behavior observation certainly aid 
Caroline through the classification process: they help her recognize her feelings as elements of 
euphoric happiness and thereby classify her emotion accordingly. But for the classification process 
to get going, such feelings, and in particular their phenomenology, need first to be apprehended. 
Caroline’s case shows that primitive introspection is an ineliminable and fundamental stage of 
the introspective process even when an introspective judgment can be formed quite quickly and 
smoothly. As noted, although she can almost immediately recognize her current emotion as intense 
joy, a preliminary shift of attention toward the phenomenology of her experience is required for 
the relevant recognition to take place. Such a preliminary act of introspective attention involves 
apprehending the phenomenology of her experience; it enables Caroline to acquire the information 
that constitutes the basis for recognition and classification. To be sure, she does not need to draw 
full attention to the phenomenology to acquire the relevant information: it is sufficient that some 
amount of attentional resources be deployed.29 Indeed, given that she is not interested in a deep 
understanding of her emotional experience (she just wants to enjoy the moment!), and that she 
can perform a rough classification based on a relatively small amount of information, the amount 
of attentional resources devoted to the experience need not be huge. Relatedly, the pre-
classificatory attentional act need not extend throughout a long stretch of time—it can be relatively 
quick. Even if brief and rough, though, such preliminary acquisition of information is required for 
Caroline to recognize her emotion; therefore, it needs to occur prior to (and thus independently 
 
29 As noted, exactly how much attention is an empirical question. We suspect that the amount of attention that is captured 
by the intensity of the experience may be sufficient for Caroline to perform at least a rough classification of her 




of) her classifying her emotion as joy. It is thus non-classificatory—it is what we call “primitive 
introspection:” being prior to classification, it must itself not involve classification. To be sure, 
recognizing her emotion as joy may require her recognizing some sub-components of it—
phenomenal aspects such as feeling her heart leaping into her chest, her body quivering with 
impatience and excitement, the urge to jump around, the world’s appearing as an open and 
welcoming place, and so on. Even so, the same reasoning applies to the classificatory process 
involved in recognition of the sub-components: for her to classify a phenomenal aspect as urge to 
jump around, she first needs to apprehend its phenomenology and acquire the information that is 
relevant for classification. As noted, elements other than the phenomenology may ground 
Caroline’s introspective judgment that she feels intense joy—behavior observation, reasoning, 
memory. But without a preliminary apprehension of the phenomenology, those elements are 
insufficient to achieve a judgment about what she feels—about the emotional experience she is 
undergoing. So, even though Caroline can almost immediately classify her experience, the 
classification process needs to be grounded in (an albeit quick and ephemeral act of) primitive 
introspection. 
 
4.2. Investigation of the phenomenology of a previously encountered emotion 
ARTHUR 
“Is your wife a teacher too?” Arthur hesitates to answer. His interlocutor suddenly seems 
threatening and contemptuous to him, and he immediately feels exposed and inadequate. He feels 
blushing, feverish. He feels burning sensations on his cheeks and on the skin of his face, hot flashes 
running through his body, his heart beating faster. He feels discomfort, uneasiness, and the urge 
to escape the eye of his interlocutor, whose gaze is too painful to stand. He feels filthy. He imagines 
himself answering that he does not have a wife, because his partner is a man, and anticipates a 
disgusted and derisive reaction from his interlocutor. He feels like a deviant, even though he knows 
he did not do anything bad. He knows very well what it is that he is feeling. This emotion has 
accompanied him for so long, showing up every time a conversation skews toward more intimate 
and personal (love and sexual) matters. Its symptoms are so familiar to him, that he only needs to 
take a quick notice at what is going on inside him to become aware that he feels shame. 
Similarly to Caroline, Arthur can almost immediately recognize the emotion that is growing within 
him, because he has been acquainted with its constituents many times before. However, even 
though the judgment that shame is taking over him can be attained rather quickly, to perform the 
classification on which the judgment is based he first needs to notice the sudden changes happening 
within him, the feelings, perceptions, and thoughts entering his field of consciousness; he needs 
to attend to them and collect information about them, even though this process may take just a 
little amount of time. 
ARTHUR (continued) 
This time, though, Arthur wants to understand his shame more deeply. He is not just interested in 
the exact cause of his shame. An important part of what he is interested in is the experience itself: 
he wants to analyze the feeling of it. For a long time, he has been able to rapidly detect the symptoms 
and recognize the emotion very soon after it starts taking him over. As soon as he detected it, he 
forced his attention away from the felt emotion, to keep being functional in the world and carry on 
the interaction with his interlocutors. He never tried to linger on the details of its phenomenology. 
He now realizes that, though he is so familiar with shame, he does not yet know it deeply—his 
knowledge of it is still rather coarse-grained. This time, he decides to isolate himself from the 
conversation and engage in the exercise of grasping the finer felt aspects of his shame. 
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In order to carry out this task, Arthur needs to pay closer attention to the phenomenal aspects of 
his emotion. Since his aim is to achieve a finer-grained understanding of his experience, an 
understanding that outstrips the quasi-automatic coarse-grained classification he usually performs, 
he needs to temporarily abstract away from the more unrefined attributions he typically attaches 
to it. Though the preliminary rough categorization may help him select the aspect of his emotion 
he wants to analyze (e.g., the feeling of discomfort, or his experiencing others as threatening and 
contemptuous), once the relevant aspect has been isolated, he needs to suspend judgment about how 
it should be classified, if he is to examine the details of its phenomenology. He thereby observes a 
set of finer-grained sensations and feelings, only some of which he can recognize and label (e.g., 
“slight oppression in my chest,” or “contortion in my stomach,” or “feeling like a deviant”). For 
those he cannot recognize or label, he might concoct a new name; he might also still be able to 
describe them partially, via more coarse-grained attributes that do not yet fully capture the 
phenomenal details he can introspectively apprehend (e.g., “a pervasive negative feeling that is 
different from any physical sensation and does not reduce to a specific thought”). At the end of 
the process, he will have attained a more refined understanding of the phenomenology of his 
shame experience. This will help him describe the experience in finer detail, though it will hardly 
enable him to capture in words all the fine-grained aspects of the phenomenology he was able to 
introspectively attend to. Still, his knowledge of his own emotion will have been enriched. 
In Arthur’s introspective inquiry, the role of primitive introspection is even more prominent. 
As with Caroline, a pre-classificatory act of attention and apprehension of the phenomenology is 
required even for the almost-immediate recognition of his emotion as shame. As before, this act 
is rapid and requires little effort. However, when Arthur undertakes the task of deepening his 
understanding of the emotional experience he is undergoing, the pre-classificatory state becomes 
more relevant and occupies longer stretches of time. As noted, even though he can classify his 
emotion, as well as some aspects or sub-components of its phenomenology, he voluntarily 
abstracts away from the relevant classification while he attends to them more closely, to grasp the 
finer phenomenal details. The introspective state he is in when he attends to the phenomenology 
of his experience while suspending judgment about classification is a state of primitive 
introspection. Lingering in a state of primitive introspection enables him to acquire additional 
information about the phenomenology of his shame experience and notice some finer phenomenal 
aspects he had overlooked. For some of those newly discovered phenomenal aspects he can find 
a satisfactory description, by applying phenomenal concepts he already possesses (e.g., “feeling of 
slight oppression in my chest”). In this kind of case, the role of primitive introspection is, as before, 
that of providing the information that is necessary for recognition. For other phenomenal aspects, 
he may be unable to elaborate an adequate description via his current conceptual repertoire. If so, 
the information he collects via primitive introspection can be used to form new phenomenal 
concepts—which he will be able to redeploy in the future, when he reencounters the same type of 
phenomenal quality. It may occur that Arthur does not form new standing concepts based on 
information provided by primitive introspection. If so, such information is irrelevant to future 
classification. But even so, having such information available will still enrich and refine his current 
grasp of the experience he is undergoing. 
 
4.3. Encountering a new emotion (1) 
PABLO 
Pablo is engrossed in playing with his Lego Duplo, when, suddenly, a loud, thunderous sound 
strikes his ears. His heart bursts, he feels it squirting up to his throat, bouncing back into the chest, 
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and then pounding so loud that he can hear it from the inside of his ears. A blistering electric surge 
spreads from his chest through the body toward its peripheries and flees out of his hands and feet. 
Then he feels his limbs shaking vigorously, his heart still beating hard, the whole body weak and 
exhausted, and his head full and heavy. His room, which until then had been a protective place, 
feels suddenly unsafe to him. He has no clue about what has happened inside him. He bursts into 
tears. 
Pablo is a child, and this is the first time he is startled. When the sudden noise strikes him, he 
undergoes a sequence of bodily feelings, as well as an overall state of insecurity, that he is unable 
to recognize or describe. He has never had many of these feelings before and lacks the phenomenal 
concepts that would apply to them. Therefore, he cannot recognize or classify his experience as 
startle. Nonetheless, he is aware of the feelings that constitute his startle experience. Arguably, he 
can also introspectively attend to them and thereby apprehend the phenomenology of the 
emotional experience he is undergoing. He can, for example, mentally point at one of its 
phenomenological aspects and wonder “what is this?”, where “this” refers to what he apprehends 
by attending to his experience. Later, he will be able to recollect the experience: “what I felt before 
was terrible!” he may think to himself. 
In this case, primitive introspection is not just a necessary step in the introspective process: it 
is the only step our subject can achieve. For since he has never experienced startle, he does not 
possess the phenomenal concepts that would enable him to interpret that experience and thereby 
enter a state of reflective introspection. Therefore, Pablo cannot move to reflective introspection 
(and, a fortiori, he cannot form a descriptive introspective judgment): primitive introspection is 
the only stage of his introspective process. Nonetheless, even though he cannot classify his 
experience, Pablo introspectively collects information about its phenomenology. He can deploy 
such information, for example, to form indexical thoughts about his experience while he is still 
having it (as when he wonders what that is), or to recollect it later. 
To be sure, by merely primitively introspecting it, Pablo does not acquire any (propositional) 
knowledge of his current emotion.30 Indeed, primitive introspection is not sufficient to form 
descriptive judgments and thus acquire knowledge about experiences. However, it is sufficient to 
acquire some information about the phenomenology of experience. Although it does not yet amount 
to knowledge, the information acquired by Pablo is an essential ground for him to acquire the 
concept of “startle” and thereby acquire the ability to form judgments and get knowledge of startle 
experiences in the future. So, even if the Pablo example does not yet feature acquisition of knowledge 
of an emotion, it still illustrates (i) the fact that primitive introspection is sufficient to acquire some 
information about the phenomenology of a first-time emotion and (ii) the fundamentality of 
primitive introspection for the acquisition of future knowledge about the relevant emotion. 
 
4.4. Encountering a new emotion (2) 
JULIETTE 
Juliette gets on the bus that will take her and other teenagers to summer camp. As she steps in, her 
eyes meet the gaze of a dark-haired, brown-eyed boy in the front row. Suddenly, she is hit by a 
pervading and unknown sensation. Something mysterious and intriguing about that boy strikes her. 
She feels her heart jumping into her chest. She loses her balance and feels her legs going limp. She 
 
30 Though it may be sufficient to acquire some other kind of knowledge, i.e., knowledge by acquaintance, which may 
not reduce to propositional knowledge. Here we remain neutral about this issue. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
PPQ for pressing us on this point. 
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feels dizzy, as if she were on a merry-go-round. She feels feverish, impatient. Hot flashes pervade 
her body. As soon as she looks away, she cannot wait for their eyes to meet again. When they do, 
she feels as if an electrical surge hit her heart and then discharged into the earth through her belly, 
where she now feels a tingling sensation, as if a swarm of butterflies were frantically fluttering in 
there. She realizes she cannot stop staring at him. He looks impressive to her. Something very 
unusual is going on inside her! She cannot tell whether it feels good or bad. It just feels strange, 
pervasive, and very intense. She blushes as soon as the boy looks at her. She wonders if she is 
ashamed. But she does not feel ashamed—she does not perceive herself as inadequate or 
contemptible. Is she afraid of him? No, she does not feel afraid either—he does not look 
threatening or dangerous to her. She has no idea what is going on with her! 
Juliette cannot recognize the emotion she is undergoing because it is the first time she feels 
romantic attraction. Nonetheless, she can still introspectively explore the emotional experience 
that pervades her body and mind. Like Caroline, Arthur, and Pablo, Juliette notices some changes 
in the phenomenology of her experience, which capture her attention. Unlike Caroline and Arthur, 
and more similarly to Pablo, she struggles to get a grasp of the experience she undergoes. A few 
aspects of it are somewhat familiar to her (e.g., hot flashes), but most are not. She is therefore 
unable to classify her overall emotional experience. In the absence of an immediately identifiable 
phenomenal concept to describe her emotion, all Juliette can do to make progress on her 
understanding of it is attend to its phenomenology. Thus, she observes a bunch of novel sensations 
(electrical surge, tingling in her belly, etc.) and perceptions (e.g., the boy looking impressive to her); 
she also notes some thoughts and desires passing through her mind (e.g., the desire that her eyes 
meet again those of the boy). She can also try to relate what she currently feels to experiences she 
had in the past. Upon feeling herself blushing, for example, she wonders whether she is ashamed, 
but realizes that she is not, because she does not perceive herself as inadequate or contemptible. 
Therefore, she goes back to the phenomenology and attends to it more closely. By noticing that 
the boy appears somewhat intimidating to her, she tentatively classifies her emotion as fear. 
However, by comparing the memory of previous fear experiences (where the object of fear 
appeared threatening and dangerous) with what she can currently introspectively attend to (the 
boy appears somewhat intimidating to her, but not really threatening or dangerous), she revises her 
judgment and excludes that she is afraid of the boy. Juliette’s introspective inquiry does not deliver 
a definite judgment. However, its results may constitute the basis upon which she can learn how to 
recognize this emotion in the future. The more familiar phenomenal aspects she was able to 
identify and label can constitute the ground for communicating her feelings to other people who, by 
comparing her reports with their own past experiences and integrating information about the 
circumstances in which those feelings arose, may suggest to Juliette a label for her new emotion. 
Juliette’s introspective inquiry relies heavily on primitive introspection. Since she has never felt 
romantic attraction before, she cannot recognize her current emotion. Accordingly, the non-
classificatory state of primitive introspection is predominant in her inquiry. To be sure, there are 
some aspects of the phenomenology she can recognize (e.g., hot flashes). But when it comes to the 
many aspects she cannot recognize, all she can do is introspect them non-classificatorily (i.e., via 
primitive introspection) and try to collect information about their phenomenology. Such 
information may constitute the ground for the acquisition of new phenomenal concepts. On the 
basis of what she can recognize, Juliette puts forward some tentative classifications (shame, fear). 
To check their adequacy, she needs to pay closer attention to the phenomenology and collect the 
information that enables her to compare her current experience with the experience-type denoted 
by the phenomenal concepts featuring in the tentative classification. To accomplish this task, 
information-collection itself has to be non-classificatory; for if the task is to check whether a given 
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classification is adequate, the introspective act through which the task is pursued cannot itself rely 
on such classification. So, primitive introspection also features in this stage of Juliette’s 
introspective process. When she realizes the inadequacy of her tentative classification, Juliette 
draws her attention back toward the phenomenology of her experience, to try and find a better 
characterization. Again, she needs to introspect her experience primitively and non-classificatorily 
collect information about its phenomenology. 
 
4.5. Introspection of a “cold” emotion 
CHARLIE 
Charlie is walking through the Galerie Neue Meister. Suddenly, Otto Dix’s The War captures her gaze. 
The painting appears impressive to her. As she lingers on its gloomy details, a disturbing feeling grows 
within her. Some parts of the painting look disgusting, some distressing, some horrifying. She cannot 
stop thinking about its violence and striking realism. At the same time, she feels as if the painting was 
imprisoning her gaze: she cannot help keeping looking at it with awe. She certainly does not find it 
beautiful—as instead she did with Hokusai’s Big Wave of Kanagawa. Still, the seeing of that painting brings 
about in her an undefinable sense of admiration.31 
Charlie is young and inexpert of art. She had some experiences of aesthetic admiration in the 
past—e.g., when she experienced the beauty of Hokusai’s Big Wave of Kanagawa—but never of the 
kind that is elicited by distressing paintings like The War. As she focuses on her experience, she 
can immediately recognize the salient and disturbing aspects of it: the painting appears horrifying, 
distressing, and violent. She also singles out a feeling of approval or attraction toward the painting, 
but she cannot make a more specific assessment of it. She certainly experiences aesthetic 
admiration. However, her understanding of that experience is very coarse-grained: she cannot form 
a fine-grained judgment about the determinate type of admiration she experiences. She can 
compare this experience with her memory of her past experience of the Big Wave, and judge that 
both involve felt approval and attraction, but are also importantly dissimilar, in ways she is yet 
unable to spell out conceptually. She has discovered a new kind of admiration experience—one 
directed toward horrifying and violent pieces of art. 
As before, even classification of the easily recognizable phenomenal aspects needs to rely on 
primitive introspection: Charlie needs to draw her introspective attention to the experience—to 
the way the painting and its details appear to her and to the feeling of discomfort they provoke in 
her—and get information about its phenomenology, on the basis of which she can perform a more 
fine-grained classification (looking horrifying, violent, etc.). When it comes to the positive and less 
salient aspect of the experience, Charlie can only classify it in a coarse-grained way—in terms of 
felt attraction, or general sense of admiration. However, the phenomenology she can grasp via 
introspective attention is much more detailed and complex—she can tell that it is a specific kind 
of admiration experience, one that is different from any other admiration experience she had in 
the past. Primitive introspection provides her with information about the specific kind of 
experience she is undergoing, which she can deploy in the future to enrich her knowledge and 








As it emerges from the previous section’s examples, primitive introspection plays a fundamental 
role in getting knowledge or understanding of one’s own emotions. For one thing, it constitutes 
an unavoidable preliminary stage of the inquiry, since it is required to collect the information that 
is necessary to classify and therefore describe and form judgments about one’s emotional 
experience. For this reason, it features in the introspective process even in cases (like Caroline’s) 
where the subject recognizes their own emotion almost immediately. For another thing, it plays an 
essential role in introspective inquiries aimed at deepening or improving one’s knowledge or 
understanding of one’s emotion. Like in the cases of Arthur, Juliette, and Charlie, primitive 
introspection may be appealed to at subsequent times throughout the introspective inquiry, to 
check, correct, or refine some tentative or coarse-grained classifications attempted by the subject. 
Finally, it may even constitute the only stage of introspective inquiry that can be achieved by a 
subject if, for example, they are unable to provide any classification of the introspected experience 
(as in Pablo’s case). 
Against the widespread deflationary and skeptical attitude towards introspection, we tried to 
revendicate the central role of introspection (in particular, of primitive introspection) for the 
acquisition of at least some self-knowledge (self-knowledge of emotional experiences). Of course, 
as noted, primitive introspection alone is not sufficient to ground one’s knowledge or understanding 
of one’s own emotions. As illustrated by our examples, subjects typically need to appeal to a variety 
of processes and methods (especially memory, but also behavior observation, inference, testimony, 
etc.) to form introspective judgments about their emotional experiences. However, we hope to 
have shown that primitive introspection constitutes a necessary stage of the introspective inquiry 
through which such knowledge or understanding is achieved.32  
 
32 We are very much grateful to Uriah Kriegel for his thorough and generous comments on a previous draft of this 
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